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Abstract 
This paper is concerned with the ‘cosmopolitan turn’ in sociology and examines the ways in 
which the discipline attempts to come to terms with the otherness of the other as a 
corrective to its own Eurocentrism. It examines in particular the pluralisation of the notion of 
modernity and argues that although this strategy allows sociology to maintain its disciplinary 
identity, it falls short of the aim of transforming the discipline into a cosmopolitan discourse. 
More broadly, the paper argues that cosmopolitanism is not a possible object of experience. 
Like other idealisations, it is plagued by what Derrida calls ‘autoimmunity’—the tendency to 
self-destruct. 
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In the last few decades there has been an increasingly influential movement in sociology that 
seeks to reform the discipline and broaden its intellectual and cultural horizons. As the 
proponents of this move argue, the aim is to transform sociology into a cosmopolitan 
discipline—open-minded, open to the world beyond Europe and the West, receptive to 
cultural difference, respectful of the otherness of the other. In short, this would be a 
discipline that would pull ‘down the walls of Euro-centrism’ (Beck and Grande 2010: 411) 
and save the rest of the world from the calumny of cultural inferiority.1 My aim in this paper 
is to explore the prospects of this fundamental change. 
To sketch the wider context of this investigation, let us note that this sort of salvation 
intent is nothing new and certainly not restricted to sociology.2 Nor has it ever been a purely 
academic affair. In the not-too-distant past enlightened colonizers sought to save the rest of 
the world from itself—from ignorance, poverty and disease, as the colonial lexicon would 
have it. Cosmopolitanism, in sociology and elsewhere, wishes to save it from Western 
misrepresentation, misrecognition and exclusion. The two are not the same, but the 
underlying structure appears very similar: the West saves the Rest and by saving it, it saves 
itself as well and confirms itself in its superior moral and cultural position—a theodicy of 
good fortune, as Max Weber would say. For it should not be assumed that this is something 
disinterested, an act of generosity, a free gift without a return. There is no such thing. As 
Derrida (1994) has shown, for reasons that have to do with the structure of things rather 
than with individual intention, giving is always taking with a certain capitalisation.3 
I will, then, approach cosmopolitan sociology’s salvation intent from a critical, 
postcolonial perspective, even though my aim is not to argue for the pluralisation of the 
notion of cosmopolitanism as postcolonial scholarship often does (e.g. Pollock et al, 2000; 
Spivak, 2012). It is, rather, to subject this notion to a rigorous deconstructive examination. 
For this reason the perspective employed here cannot be that of postcolonial sociology 
either.4 The latter takes for granted and uses as a key analytical category the highly 
problematic notion of modernity—highly problematic because, among other problems, it 
requires a devalued and excluded other to have any meaning and to make sense, namely, 
the pre-modern and the traditional. Rather, the perspective used here is more akin to the 
anthropological theorisation of cultural diversity and difference—the perspective, let us say, 
of a postcolonial anthropology. 
To be sure, cosmopolitan sociology’s salvation intent is not always clearly visible in 
accounts of the new discipline. It is often downplayed or hidden behind the façade of 
positive, value-free science. Yet there is no doubt that it is there behind the scenes, 
orchestrates the whole effort and points to where all such intentions ultimately point to: the 
end of history hence also the beginning, the ‘time’ before the fall into history and time and a 
state of pure humanity or human purity and innocence. Putting the matter in this way—
highlighting, that is, cosmopolitan sociology’s metaphysical intention—the new discipline 
emerges as a lost cause. Yet it is one thing to posit its impossibility axiomatically and another 
to demonstrate it in practice. Accordingly, I will follow closely cosmopolitan sociology’s 
argumentation and try to identify the dilemmas, contradictions, impasses that it runs into all 
by itself. The discussion will be guided by two interrelated questions. Given the cultural 
diversity and difference in the world, can sociology become cosmopolitan and remain 
sociology—a discipline premised on the idea of modernity and the teleology of progress? 
Secondly, and thinking beyond particular disciplines, is cosmopolitanism understood as the 
inclusion of the otherness of the other in the sameness of the self itself possible? Can it ever 
appear in the empirical world, in society and history and become an object of experience, or 
is it simply a figment of a certain type of imagination—the imagination of (largely) Western 
‘frequent travellers’ and academics (Calhoun, 2002, 2010), for example? 
 
Preliminary questions 
I shall begin, in a preliminary fashion, with what I have already announced—hiding 
cosmopolitan sociology’s salvation intent behind the façade of a positive, scientific 
discipline—and the problems that this leads to. What I have in mind is Ulrich Beck, arguably 
one of the most influential figures of cosmopolitan sociology, and the distinction he makes 
between cosmopolitanism in philosophy and the ‘cosmopolitan realism’ of a ‘value-free’ 
sociology. The former, Beck says, is normative, the latter ‘descriptive-analytic’ or ‘analytic-
empirical’. Accordingly, ‘it sees the increased interdependence of social actors across 
national boundaries as an unintended and unforeseen side effect of actions that have no 
normative “cosmopolitan intent”’ (2004: 132). In this version, cosmopolitan sociology is 
concerned not with prescription—the tearing down the walls of Eurocentrism—but with 
description and analysis. It should be clear that Beck wishes to maintain the impression of a 
value-free, positive science but for a new discipline this is a rather old strategy. As Inglis 
argues, it is the strategy that Durkheim himself employed more than a century ago. In a 
paper concerned with highlighting the presumed cosmopolitanism of classical sociology, 
Inglis (2013: 14-15) says that Durkheim’s aim was ‘not just to unite the normative and the 
empirical realms, but [also] to ground the former in the latter, in order to avoid accusations 
of abstraction and utopianism’. It seems that this is precisely what Beck wishes to avoid as 
well. 
Durkheim may have been able to get away with his positivism, but things are much 
more difficult for Beck. This is not only because the times have changed and positivism is no 
longer fashionable but also because it undermines his project of cosmopolitan sociology. The 
problem is one of ‘epistemological nationalism’ or ‘methodological parochialism’—to 
paraphrase one of Beck’s key terms—a parochial epistemology that pretends to be universal. 
To put this into perspective, we should take a quick look at the kind of inclusiveness that 
Beck envisions for cosmopolitan sociology. It seems that it would be an all-inclusive 
discourse. Beyond the otherness of the other, it intends to include the ‘otherness of nature’ 
as well as the ‘otherness of the future’. And this is only with regard to the ‘external’ 
dimensions of cosmopolitanism. There are also the ‘internal’ dimensions which refer to the 
inclusion of the ‘otherness of the object’ and ‘overcoming the (state) mastery of (scientific, 
linear) rationalization’ (Beck, 2002: 18). 
  There is a crowding of ‘othernesses’ in Beck’s schema but here I will be concerned 
only with the otherness of nature. We know of many societies in which nature is not other 
but the same, ‘societies of nature’ as Descola (1996) calls them, such as the tribal societies of 
the Amazon or tribes of the Arctic like the Inuit (Ingold, 2000). These societies do not 
distinguish between society and nature. Nature is society, the animals that inhabit it persons 
endowed with will and intentions like human beings. This is no doubt an ontology far 
removed from the Western rationalist paradigm and the idea of the disenchantment of the 
world. How then, can Beck reconcile a positive social science with a cosmopolitan sociology 
that encourages the inclusion of the otherness of nature? How can he reconcile it with the 
inclusion of the otherness of the other when a key aspect of this otherness is the fact that 
for these others nature is not other but the same? Beck does not seem to have even 
considered such questions. 
Let us note here another kind of parochialism in which cosmopolitan sociology is 
enmeshed—‘disciplinary parochialism’, as Inglis (2013: 16) says, which is to say, the lack of 
communication with other disciplines. Although Inglis does not mention anthropology in this 
respect—itself a disciplinary parochialism of the first order—lack of communication with this 
discipline is especially problematic. For it is the discipline of cultural difference and 
otherness par excellence. Even so, and beyond the occasional name dropping, there is no 
recognition of anthropology’s contribution, neither of the discipline’s conceptual tools and 
method nor of the immense body of literature on non-Western societies it has generated. 
Anthropology and its (disciplinary) otherness are excluded by cosmopolitan sociology. 
Inglis thinks that sociology’s disciplinary parochialism can be overcome. ‘It is time’, he 
says, ‘to make cosmopolitanism studies itself more cosmopolitan’ (2013: 16; my emphasis). 
Perhaps it can be overcome, but we should be clear on the potential costs. Without a certain 
degree of disciplinary parochialism or conservatism, without lines to separate them into 
distinct entities, disciplines would fuse into another and lose their identity. Hence sociology 
has a choice (of sorts). It can become fully cosmopolitan but run the risk of fusing into 
‘cosmopolitanism studies’, even becoming some sort of anthropology; or it can retain its 
identity as sociology but remain parochial, at least in disciplinary terms. In the former case, it 
would no longer be sociology, in the latter, it would not be cosmopolitan. 
As I have already suggested, there is little danger of sociology losing its disciplinary 
identity and certainly no danger of it lapsing into anthropology. Unlike the latter, which 
treats cultural diversity as so many experiments in being human, sociology posits a specific 
ontology: to be (a human being or a human society) is to be modern. Although its professed 
intention is to recognise the otherness of the other, cosmopolitan sociology is not prepared 
to abandon this master category. 
 So far we have been discussing in a preliminary fashion the prospects of 
cosmopolitan sociology. As I have suggested however, there is an even broader question 
that concerns the prospect of cosmopolitanism as such, whether sociological, 
anthropological, or of any other kind.5 This question is raised by Calhoun in a set of essays 
critical of cosmopolitan sociology, even if the implications of the critique are not pursued 
and fully drawn. Calhoun (2002: 873) observes, among other things, that the ‘advocates [of 
cosmopolitanism] offer a claim to being without determinate social bases that is reminiscent 
of Mannheim’s idea of the free-floating intellectual’. We no longer believe in the existence 
of the free-floating intellectual who can be objective. Can we believe in the existence of the 
free-floating individual who can be cosmopolitan? Calhoun suggests that we cannot. ‘In 
offering a seeming “view from nowhere”, cosmopolitans commonly offer a view from 
Brussels … or from Davos … or from the university’. There is no such thing as a view from 
nowhere. Everyone is situated somewhere—historically, socially, culturally—and has a view 
of the world accessible from that particular position. A view from somewhere can only be 
partial, which is to say, limited and subjective; a view from Brussels, or Davos, or the 
university can only be parochial. As we have seen, Beck’s sociology strives to be both a 
value-free, objective science and a cosmopolitan discourse. It is already beginning to 
become apparent that it can be neither. 
 
Reformation 
What can one expect from a cosmopolitan sociology? And how does it propose to achieve 
what it sets out to do? As we have seen, its aim is nothing less than to eliminate all those 
Eurocentric distinctions that traditional sociology or the sociology of ‘first modernity’, as 
Beck says, has been using to structure the world: the modern and the traditional, developed 
and underdeveloped societies, First and Third world, centre and periphery. ‘The categories 
of framing world society—the distinction between highly developed and underdeveloped 
countries, between tradition and modernity—are collapsing. In the cosmopolitan paradigm 
… the non-Western societies share the same time and space horizon with the West’. The 
reference to time (if not space) has to do with the practice, long identified in anthropology 
as evolutionism, of placing non-European societies in the European past. In sociology too, or 
at least cosmopolitan sociology, this practice is now itself in the past. In the past, Beck says, 
‘the non-Western societies were defined by their foreignness and otherness, their 
“traditional”, “extra-modern” or “pre-modern” character’. This is no longer the case. ‘Now 
strangeness is replaced by the amazement at the similarities’ (Beck, 2000: 88). 
Beyond criticising traditional sociology for dividing the world, cosmopolitan sociology 
has been critical of a certain kind of cosmopolitanism for over-unifying it. This is the 
universalistic cosmopolitanism of philosophy and political theory (Delanty, 2006) which fails 
to recognise cultural diversity and accord other ways of life due respect. ‘The time has come 
to move beyond the latent Eurocentrism that persists in cosmopolitan thought’, Delanty 
points out. Cosmopolitanism ‘as a normative idea, in the most general sense … is about the 
value of taking into account the perspective of the other and placing oneself within a wider 
whole, which can generally be taken to be the world’ (Delanty, 2014: 2). Delanty highlights 
four universalistic, Eurocentric tendencies in cosmopolitanism: ‘Civilizational universalism’, 
namely, the ‘claim that Europe or the West is … superior either intellectually, morally or 
politically to the rest of the world’; ‘analytical universalism’, which is the ‘lesser claim that 
European patterns of societal development provide the basic model for understanding the 
rest of the world’ (2014: 5); ‘European exceptionalism’, which is ‘the more moderate claim … 
that the rise of Europe can be explained more or less exclusively by reference to endogenous 
processes of development without any consideration of the positive contribution of the non-
European world’; and finally, an even ‘weaker form of Eurocentrism’ is ‘conceptual 
Europeanism’, which is the ‘application of concepts, categories and theories of European 
origin to the non-European world’ (2014: 6). 
To replace all this Delanty proposes a ‘critical cosmopolitanism’ which, he says, is a 
‘mid-way position’ between universalism and particularism. Is such a position possible 
however? It should be clear that what Delanty and other like-minded sociologists want is the 
best of both worlds, hence an ideal world, a world in which a discourse can be both 
universalistic and particularistic at the same time—‘half’ universalistic and ‘half’ 
particularistic to be precise—universalistic but not to the extent that it effaces particularism 
and particularistic but not to the extent that it prevents universalisation. In short, they want 
a world in which it would be possible to have one’s cake and eat it or, as we shall see, to 
square the circle. 
To return to the critique of first modernity and its Eurocentric sociological discourse: 
Beck makes a distinction between ‘methodological nationalism’ and ‘methodological 
cosmopolitanism’. The first, he argues, is the result of conflating the national with the social 
and applying the categories developed for making sense of the former to global phenomena. 
By contrast, methodological cosmopolitanism recognises that much of contemporary social 
reality transcends the confines of the nation-state and cannot be understood with the 
existing categories. 
To me the ‘cosmopolitanization thesis’ is a methodological concept which 
helps to overcome methodological nationalism…. The central defining 
characteristic of a cosmopolitan perspective is the ‘dialogic imagination’…. 
The national perspective is a monologic imagination, which excludes the 
otherness of the other. The cosmopolitan perspective is … an imagination 
of alternative ways of life and rationalities which include the otherness of 
the other (Beck, 2002: 18). 
To an anthropologist, all this—recognition of the otherness of the other, celebration of 
cultural difference, the critique of Eurocentrism—sounds very familiar. As I have suggested, 
such things have been the key concerns of anthropology for almost a century. But there is 
more, which goes beyond anthropology. Cosmopolitan sociology appears so determined to 
include the otherness of the other in the sameness of the self that it has devised a new logic, 
an all-inclusive ‘cosmo-logic’, so flexible that it can accommodate even the most radical of 
oppositions. 
Methodological cosmopolitanism rejects the either-or principle and 
assembles the this-as-well-as-that principle…. What the ‘cosmo-logic’ 
signifies is its thinking and living in terms of inclusive oppositions … and 
rejecting the logic of exclusive oppositions, which characterizes 
methodological nationalism and first modernity sociology…. 
Cosmopolitanism means: rooted cosmopolitanism,6 having ‘roots’ and 
‘wings’ at the same time. So it rejects the dominant opposition between 
cosmopolitans and locals as well: there is no cosmopolitanism without 
localism (Beck, 2002: 19). 
 There is much to say about this new ‘logic’ and whether it is logical at all, and I shall return 
to it in the next section. For the moment let us note that this sort of cosmopolitan rhetoric 
may be responsible for generating images of sociology that can hardly be defended. One 
example of hyperbolism is the claim that sociology has been cosmopolitan from the outset, 
since its inception as an academic discipline in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century (e.g. Inglis, 2013); another, that it has been operating with an ethical hermeneutic 
receptive to the otherness of the other. Here I will examine briefly a paper that makes both 
claims, Turner’s (2006) ‘critical defence of the social’. 
 For Turner the way that sociology has been developed by Durkheim ‘points towards a 
cosmopolitan epistemology of a shared reality’ (Turner, 2006: 140). Durkheim, he argues, 
followed Kant in seeking what makes us all human, ‘an attitude [which] is the foundation of 
cosmopolitan virtue’ (2006: 141). Turner appears to be in agreement with this attitude. It is 
therefore rather ironic that in the next section of his paper he will not proceed to develop a 
cosmopolitan sociology (one of the essay’s aims) along Kantian and Durkheim lines. It may 
be ironic but it should not be surprising. As we have seen, a universalistic cosmopolitanism 
of the Kantian type is too visibly Eurocentric to be acceptable. What Turner will do instead is 
to turn to Max Weber and his verstehende soziologie. And here he will present an image of 
sociology almost indistinguishable from anthropology. 
 Turner proposes an ethical hermeneutic which, he says, is consistent with Weber’s 
philosophy of the social sciences. ‘Understanding the Other requires a careful construction 
of their meanings and values in social interaction; it requires value clarification and 
description’. This hermeneutic labour, we may add, presupposes the assumption that 
however strange, exotic, or irrational a native practice or belief may seem from the outside, 
it does make sense in its own cultural context and is meaningful to the people involved. 
Turner’s claim is that sociology ‘tended’ to operate precisely on the basis of this 
fundamental assumption. ‘Sociological understanding tended to exclude the idea of 
irrationality in action, preferring to argue for the meaningfulness of actions in their 
context…. Sociology sought plausible accounts of the actions of others in terms of their own 
meaning systems’ (Turner, 2006: 145; my emphasis). I do not know whether sociologists 
would recognise themselves in what Turner says, but I am quite certain that anthropologists 
would. His description of what sociology supposedly ‘tended’ to do—but no longer does?—
fits exactly what anthropology has actually been doing for almost a century—seeking to 
understand ‘the native’s point of view’, as Malinowski would have it. 
Yet this imaginary sociology will not be allowed to become anthropology, not even in 
the imagination. Unlike anthropology, Turner will argue, sociology has room for judgment 
and criticism. ‘Recognition involves recognition of the Other [my emphasis], but it does not 
necessarily require an uncritical acceptance of their values in toto’ (Turner, 2006: 144). 
Although sociology has been trying to understand the other’s point of view, being ‘a critical 
science, left open the possibility for criticism of other’s actions’. This sharply distinguishes it 
from ‘anthropological descriptive relativism and from epistemological disinterest, because 
these anthropological positions rule out any judgement’ (Turner, 2006: 145). 
 The tautology I have highlighted above shows a certain degree of uncertainty as to 
what recognition of the other should mean. Turner assumes that in anthropology it means 
uncritical acceptance of the values of other societies, but this is hardly the case. Cultural 
relativism and epistemological disinterest, anthropologists would point out, are 
methodological tools, ways of bracketing off the preconceptions of their society in the hope 
of gaining a less biased understanding of the culture in question. In light of the fact that, as 
Beck’s example shows, sociology presents itself even today as a value-free, objective 
discipline, it is rather ironic that this strategy is misunderstood. It is also dangerous. Without 
this strategy it is hardly possible to develop what Turner claims sociology has been seeking 
to develop—‘plausible accounts of the actions of others in terms of their own meaning 
systems’. Instead, one would be constructing such accounts on the basis of one’s own 
meaning system. What is more, and more problematic, it would be on the basis of these 
highly compromised accounts that one would criticise the other’s actions, claiming all along 
that they are nothing other than ‘critical science’. 
Turner would no doubt say that criticism is not, and should be the monopoly of the 
West. ‘Mutual recognition has to be able to incorporate mutual criticism’ (Turner, 2006: 
144). The example he uses to illustrate this is highly significant because it shows that 
criticism between us and them is ‘mutual’ only in name. What is to be criticised as well as 
the means of critique only serve to highlight the asymmetrical relations between us as these 
are encapsulated in the distinction between the modern and the pre-modern or the 
traditional. The example concerns religion and more specifically Islam. Muslims, Turner says, 
are free to criticise ‘Christian Trinitarianism [as being] incompatible with a theology of 
monotheism’. We are in turn free to criticise the lack of ‘personal autonomy’ in Muslim 
theology (2006: 144) or, for that matter, holy war. ‘Sociological understanding should not 
prevent us from engaging in critical recognition and evaluation of other cultures including 
notions of jihad and crusade’ (Turner, 2006: 145). It should be clear that the hypothetical 
topic of the Muslim critique is self-victimising: it places Muslims in the European past. They 
are still concerned with something—organised religion and its theological subtleties—which 
to us (secular Europeans) is hardly relevant and meaningful. As Beck (2010) says in A God of 
One’s Own in Western societies religion is not a given but fashioned by the individual to 
meet personal need. This is in contrast to the ‘absolute faith’ of other religions—the sort of 
faith, Beck says, that breeds intolerance and violence.7 
Similar considerations apply to our choice of critique. Personal autonomy (if there is 
such a thing) is the mark of modern society, while in criticising ‘jihad and crusade’ we are 
reiterating that they still live in the European past—the Middle Ages. For, they are still 
engaged in the kind of war that we also fought but eight centuries ago. Finally, note that the 
same asymmetry reproduces itself when it comes to the means of critique. It is on the basis 
of religious belief that they will criticise us. We, on the other hand, will criticise them on the 
basis of social scientific knowledge. 
It seems then, that cosmopolitan sociology is not prepared to abandon the idea of 
modernity, not even when it imagines itself to be operating much like anthropology. As a 
result it ends up reproducing all the divisions it sets out to eliminate—between the modern 
and the traditional, developed and underdeveloped societies, centre and periphery, First and 
Third world. If it could abandon this idea, the discipline would perhaps become a 
cosmopolitan discourse. Yet it would no longer be sociology. But perhaps not everything is 
lost. Perhaps cosmopolitan sociology is still possible. It may be possible to pluralise 
modernity and share it with the rest of the world. Sociology, in other words, could come to 
recognise that although different, non-Western societies are as modern as Western 
societies—modern in their own way. 
 
Multi-modernism 
We will have to return to Beck for the pluralisation of modernity since he is once again the 
leading proponent of this move. As we have seen, for Beck the aim of methodological 
cosmopolitanism is to pull down the walls of Eurocentrism. This will be achieved, he says, by 
pluralising the ‘theory of the society in the singular’ and making it a ‘theory of societies in 
the plural’. Let us note here, partly to highlight again sociology’s disciplinary parochialism 
and partly to avoid misunderstanding, that what is to be pluralised is not the theory but 
society—‘plural refers to the very different paths and contexts of modernization processes’. 
Since sociologically speaking there is only one type of society worthy of serious 
consideration—‘sociological theory from its very beginning has been concerned to formulate 
a general theory of (modern) society’ (Beck and Grande, 2010: 411)—what is to be pluralised 
is modernity itself. It does not seem to have occurred to Beck and Grande to question this 
assumption and consider other theories of social reality. Sociological theory may be revised 
to refer to societies in the plural but these would still be modern societies. Everything else 
would presumably fall through the net. 
The point of the cosmopolitan turn in sociology, Beck and Grande argue, ‘is to open 
up to the possibility of a variety of different and autonomous interlinked modernities 
(“plurality of modernities”)’ (2010: 413). Let us note, to begin with, that ‘plurality of 
modernities’ does not refer to what Beck has been calling ‘first’ and ‘second’ modernity. As 
Beck and Grande point out, ‘a reformulated theory of reflexive modernization must argue 
that nowadays we all live in a Second, Cosmopolitan Modernity—regardless of whether we 
have experienced First Modernity or not’ (2010: 418; my emphasis). Not only are we all 
modern, but we all live in the second age of modernity. This must be argued, the authors 
say, but the argument is contradicted two pages earlier when they consider, among other 
variables of different modernization processes, the result—‘the result: “successful” vs. 
“failed”’. As they go on to explain, there is a ‘path of “failed” modernization—where the 
establishment of the institutions of the First Modernity (like the nation-state) or the 
transformation into the Second Modernity ends in failure’. This is contrasted with the 
successful paths: ‘the Western path …unintended [and] temporally stretched’; the path of an 
‘active, “compressed” modernization driven by a developmental state’; and ‘post-colonialism 
as the project of a reactive, enforced modernization’ (2010: 416). We do not know which 
countries are to be placed under the failed category as the authors mention no names. But 
we do know at least some of the countries of the ‘active and compressed’ path—‘Korea and 
China’—while elsewhere Beck (2002: 22) speaks of ‘alternative visions of Asian, Chinese, 
Latin American modernities’. The point, in any case, is that as this typology makes clear—and 
as the exclusion of Africa from the list of ‘alternative’ modernities suggests—we do not all 
live in second modernity after all. There are some who have failed to reach it and 
presumably live in the age of first modernity. And there are some who have not even make it 
into first modernity and presumably still live in pre-modern society. It seems that the plan to 
pull down the walls of Eurocentrism without abandoning the idea of modernity is slowly 
beginning to unravel. 
This conclusion is reinforced by other considerations. To begin with, there is a level of 
social reality which the notion of modernity, whether first or second, fails to capture but 
which is highly significant when it comes to dealing with the otherness of the other. It was 
Calhoun (2010) who noted the irony with the empirical studies of Asian countries which Beck 
and Grande’s essay (2010) was meant to introduce. Although they professed 
‘methodological cosmopolitanism’, all of them focused on national cases. It was also 
Calhoun who noted that ‘if we seek a more cosmopolitan sociology it will need to include a 
variety of accounts focused on other analytic objects’ (2010: 617). Calhoun does not specify 
what these analytic objects might be, but from the context of the discussion one can surmise 
that he means analytic objects over and above the nation-state. Since my aim is to 
problematize the prospects of a cosmopolitan sociology, I wish to make a case for the 
contrary—the need to focus on analytic objects that appear below rather than above the 
national level. What I have in mind is what one might call ‘local culture’, the beliefs and 
practices of ordinary people manifested in everyday life. As I have already suggested, this 
level is highly significant because it is here, unmediated by the state and its institutions that 
the otherness of the other emerges fully, that is, as radical cultural difference. We have 
already looked briefly at ‘societies of nature’ and the ways in which animals are understood. 
Here I will mention equally briefly a different example, the case of South Africa, arguably a 
modern nation-state by Beck and Grande’s typology. How then is cosmopolitan sociology to 
deal with the emergence of what Jean and John Comaroff (1999) call ‘occult economies’, 
that is, the deployment of magic and witchcraft for material gain? How will it deal with 
practices such as selling body parts, said to bring good luck and aid fertility, or the 
appearance of zombies, the dead brought back to life by witches to work for them for free? 
Is the plurality of modernity plural enough to accommodate such beliefs and practices or 
would they be dismissed in the usual arrogant modernist way—as pre-modern, tribal 
superstitions? 
These empirical considerations point to a broader theoretical issue. Cosmopolitan 
sociology cannot pluralise modernity to such an extent as to include all forms of cultural 
difference because if it did, it would become meaningless, an empty signifier. As we have 
noted already, to be something modernity must not be everything, to have any meaning and 
make sense it must be different from its others (and no doubt deferred). Thus, although it is 
possible to ‘expand the circumference of the circle to include [others]’ (Beck and Grande, 
2010: 417), there are limits to this expansion. A telling example of this limitation is Beck’s 
distinction between cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism and his rejection of the latter—a 
move which to some postcolonial critics appears as a contradiction in Beck’s overall schema. 
Yet, as we shall see shortly, there is no contradiction here; Beck is being consistent in his 
thinking. In his understanding, multiculturalism undermines modernity’s fundamental 
principles. It must therefore be excluded. Let us first turn to the critique. 
A […] significant problem with Beck’s call for more appropriate sociological 
concepts is that his version of cosmopolitanism is at odds with the global 
age he describes. To the extent that multiple modernities, as the 
contemporary condition of the global world, are predicated on cultural 
inflections of modernity, then the world has to be understood as a 
multicultural world. Beck’s version of cosmopolitanism, however, is set out 
in both explicit and implicit opposition, if not downright hostility, to 
understandings of multiculturalism (Bhambra, 2011: 317; my emphasis). 
 Contrary to what Bhambra suggests, a multi-modern world ‘does not have to be’ 
understood as a multicultural world, as the two are by no means equivalent. 
Multiculturalism’s point of departure is cultural diversity, multi-modernism’s the diversity of 
modernity. The latter is ‘a form of global multiculturalism’, (Bhambra, 2011: 318; my 
emphasis), and this is precisely the point: it is a kind of multiculturalism and a rather limited 
one at that. For example, it appears unable to accommodate the veiling of Muslim women in 
European societies as an acceptable cultural manifestation. As Bhambra herself notes, ‘there 
appears to be little recognition of the potential discrimination against those subject to the 
face veil ban … in France and other European countries’ (2011: 318). 
That there is no contradiction in Beck’s rejection of multiculturalism, that he is being 
consistent as a modernist becomes apparent when one considers how he understands 
multiculturalism—in terms of the traditional sociological definition of the traditional. For 
Beck multiculturalism cannot be accepted precisely because its philosophy of the social is at 
‘loggerheads’ with modernity’s philosophy. 
Multiculturalism … fosters a collective image of humanity in which the 
individual remains dependent on his cultural sphere. He (or she) is the 
product of the language, the traditions, the convictions, the customs and 
landscapes in which he came into the world and in which he grew up…. In 
this sense multiculturalism is at loggerheads with individualization. 
According to the multicultural premise the individual does not exist…. 
Cosmopolitanism argues the reverse and presupposes individualization 
(Beck, 2002: 36-37). 
Anyone trained in the social sciences will not fail to recognise in this quotation Durkheim’s 
distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity. Multiculturalism is presented as an 
example of the former, cosmopolitanism of the latter. Cosmopolitanism presupposes 
individualization because it presupposes modernity. Any society or culture seen to depart 
form this prescription must be excluded if the modern in the multi-modern is to have any 
meaning and make any sense. 
Bhambra concludes her critique by pointing out that ‘Beck’s version of 
cosmopolitanism is an expression of cultural Eurocentrism masquerading as potential global 
inclusivity (2011: 325). I am in agreement with this view. I am also sympathetic to Bhambra’s 
vision of cosmopolitan sociology: ‘A cosmopolitan sociology that was open to different 
voices would be one that provincialized European understandings, not one based on the 
perpetuation of “triumphalist” ideas of Europe’s contribution to world society’ (2011: 325). 
No doubt, but if Europe’s understanding of itself and of the rest of the world is shaped 
fundamentally by the idea of modernity, should not this idea be the very first thing to be 
‘provincialized’? And if the resulting discourse succeeds in being cosmopolitan—which is not 
at all certain—would it still be ‘sociology’? 
This brings me to another problematic aspect of Beck’s cosmopolitan sociology—its 
‘cosmo-logic’. As we have seen, this logic is meant to replace the ‘either-or principle’ with 
the more inclusive ‘this-as-well-as-that principle’. As an example of this latter principle Beck 
mentions ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’, having ‘roots’ and ‘wings’ at the same time, as he says. 
Our analysis has shown that such a creature can only be a figment of the imagination, that 
far from rejecting ‘the dominant opposition between cosmopolitans and locals’, Beck’s 
cosmopolitan sociology reproduces it. This is precisely what the distinction between 
cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism does. The latter, as Beck describes it—treating the 
person as ‘the product of the language, the traditions, the convictions, the customs and 
landscapes in which he came into the world and in which he grew up’—is another word for 
the local. 
Beck denies his ‘cosmo-logic’ in another, related context. The discussion is about ‘the 
universalist-pluralist dilemma’ and the question raised is whether ‘there is a single 
cosmopolitanism or several?’ Beck is of the opinion that ‘there is not one language of 
cosmopolitanism, but many languages, tongues, grammars’. Nonetheless, as he rightly 
points out, ‘where there are many cosmopolitanisms, perhaps none is left, because there are 
no generalizable characteristics which allow it to be clearly distinguished, for example, from 
multiculturalism’ (Beck, 2002: 35; my emphasis). Cosmopolitanism then, much like 
modernity (or anything else for that matter), cannot be this-as-well-as-that. If it could be, it 
would not be—‘none would be left’. It can only be either this or that, that is, something 
specific—which brings me to the last question that I wish to address in this paper. Is 
cosmopolitanism this or that? Is it anything at all? 
 
‘Autoimmunity’: To be is not to be 
In the foregoing discussion I have tried to show that turning sociology into a cosmopolitan 
discipline is not a viable proposition. On the one hand, the idea of modernity is in the way—
even when it is pluralised—on the other, without this idea sociology would not be itself, not 
the discipline that we have come to recognise by that name. In this final section of the paper 
I will consider cosmopolitanism itself, beyond or above any specific discipline. 
We have already noted Calhoun’s perceptive comment on sociology’s attempt to 
become cosmopolitan—that it presupposes the same impossible persona as positive 
sociology, the free-floating individual. I will not however, use this argument in the analysis 
that follows. Rather, I will turn to Beck once again and follow him as he attempts to manage 
some rather difficult questions that, to his credit, he himself raises. Let us go back to the 
‘universalist-pluralist dilemma’ and in particular the preoccupation with ‘squaring the circle 
of abstract universalism by emphasising respect for the particularity of human diversity’ 
(Beck and Grande, 2010: 417). The problem, as Beck sees it, is the following. 
  Universalism posits equality axiomatically, as a matter of principle, hence in general 
and in the abstract, by virtue of the fact that others are human beings like us. By doing so 
however, it neglects the equally indisputable fact that human beings are also empirical 
creatures, concrete individuals who live in society and history and have developed different 
ways of dealing with life. As a result, cultural difference emerges, at best as insignificant, at 
worse as inferior ways of life that need to be corrected (through outside imposition if 
necessary). Universalism then, is self-contradictory. It denies at the empirical level the 
equality it posits axiomatically. The reverse strategy however, Beck goes on to say, is not any 
better: ‘relativism and contextualism are likewise self-contradictory’. The emphasis on 
particularity ‘has its source in an impulse to recognize the otherness of the other’. To 
appreciate other ways of life and show the necessary respect, one needs to adopt the 
other’s perspective, to see the world from the native’s point of view, as Malinowski said. 
When cultural difference is conceived in absolute terms however, this change in perspective 
becomes impossible. The claim ‘that perspectives cannot be compared [is] a claim that 
amounts to irremediable mutual ignorance’ (Beck, 2004: 431). In other words, the ‘impulse’ 
for recognition and appreciation of the otherness of the other is denied by the impossibility 
of understanding what this otherness might be. 
 This is the ‘circle to be squared’. As we have seen, what is required to square it is a 
universalism that is universalistic enough to secure the existence of certain fundamental 
principles across the board but not universalistic to the extent that it dismisses cultural 
difference. Alternatively, the circle could also be squared if it would be possible to develop a 
cultural relativism that was relativistic enough to secure recognition of, and respect for 
cultural difference but not relativistic to the extent that it denies the existence of any 
common ground among cultures. In short, what is required is the best of both worlds, an 
ideal world in which universalism and relativism exist in harmony, not in opposition. Is there 
a discourse capable of achieving such a feat—to square the circle? Beck thinks there is. It is 
‘realistic cosmopolitanism’, he says, a discourse which ‘presupposes a universalist minimum 
that includes a number of inviolable substantive norms’ (Beck, 2004: 431). Let us note here 
before proceeding any further that another word for this ‘realistic cosmopolitanism’ is 
‘Western universalism’, insofar at least as the latter ‘promotes the principles of liberty and 
equality throughout the world’. For, these principles are the universalist minimum that Beck 
has in mind. As he says, ‘it is not possible to proclaim global human rights, on the one hand, 
and to have a Muslim, African, Jewish, Christian, or Asian charter of human rights, on the 
other’ (Beck, 2004: 435). It is not possible presumably because the (secular) Western 
understanding of what it means to be human and to have rights is universal and non-
negotiable. 
We shall look into the meaning of the world-wide ‘promotion’ of ‘realistic 
cosmopolitanism’/ ‘Western universalism’ in a minute. For the moment, let us return to the 
claim that ‘realistic cosmopolitanism’ can square the circle of cultural universalism and 
particularism, sameness and difference. It seems that there are limits to what it can do after 
all, and Beck calls on his readers to ‘embrace’ this ‘painful’ limitation and the contradiction in 
which it is implicated. 
Realistic cosmopolitanism must … confront the painful question of its own 
limits: should recognition of the other’s freedom apply equally to despots 
and democrats, predators and prey? Realistic cosmopolitans … must come 
to terms with the idea that, in making respect for the other the heart of 
their program, cosmopolitanism produces enemies who can be checked 
only by force. The contradiction must be embraced that, in order to protect 
one’s basic principles (the defence of civil rights and difference), it may in 
some circumstances be necessary to violate them (Beck, 2004: 431; my 
emphases). 
  I have highlighted the term ‘civil rights’ as this is a sudden shift in terminology—the term 
used before and after this statement is ‘human’, not ‘civil’ rights. But perhaps this change 
was necessary to make the violation of human rights (albeit of the enemies of 
cosmopolitanism) more palatable and to render less contradictory hence less painful and 
more ‘embraceable’ the contradiction involved in the violation. Whatever the case, it is clear 
from what Beck says that he expects his readers to embrace the contradiction with or 
without his coaxing. As far as he is concerned, the contradiction signifies the limits of 
cosmopolitanism, not its impossibility. The people who must embrace the contradiction are 
already cosmopolitans—‘realistic cosmopolitans’. It is true that sometimes they must 
behave in non-cosmopolitan ways, for example, when they are forced to violate the ‘civil 
rights’ of the enemies of cosmopolitanism, ‘despots’ and ‘predators’. But even then, it is for 
the sake of human rights that the violation occurs. One may choose to call this violation 
‘humanitarian intervention’ or, critically, colonialism, but if so this is a ‘human rights 
colonialism’ (Beck, 2004: 435). The violation, then, does not mean that the violators are not 
cosmopolitan. They are—as much as anyone can be in an imperfect world. One could say 
perhaps that they are cosmopolitan for the most part or most of the time, that although 
cosmopolitanism may not exist in a pure state, this does not mean that it does not exist at 
all. 
 Yet the conceptualisation of cosmopolitanism as something partial, a matter of 
degree rather than kind is nothing more than illusion. There is no time for anyone to be 
cosmopolitan, whether most of the time, some of the time, or in the meantime. There is no 
time because, as it has been said many times over and over a very long period of time—from 
Aristotle to St Augustine to Kant to Heidegger and Derrida—time as such does not exist. As 
soon as cosmopolitanism appears on the scene, at the same moment non-cosmopolitanism 
makes its appearance as well. As soon as there are cosmopolitans, there are also enemies of 
cosmopolitanism. It is inevitable that they appear at the same time. Without its reverse, 
cosmopolitanism would have no meaning or reason to exist; without despots, predators, 
nationalists, in a word, enemies of cosmopolitanism, there would be no need for 
cosmopolitans either. What this means is that the contradiction that Beck identifies in 
systemic or endemic—a pandemic. It means that cosmopolitanism is always already plagued 
by it. It is not the case, as Beck says, that to protect the basic principles of cosmopolitanism 
it may in ‘some circumstances’ be necessary to violate them. It is always necessary to violate 
them in all circumstances. For, they are always already and by definition violated by despots 
and predators. 
Thus, we are faced with the following impossible situation—for we are dealing with 
an impossible being. If we do not protect our basic principles—human rights, freedom, 
equality, respect for cultural difference and so on—they are destroyed by the enemies of 
cosmopolitanism. If we do protect them, we destroy them ourselves since protection 
necessitates that we deny these principles to the enemies of cosmopolitanism—a 
predicament that, as we have seen, Derrida calls ‘autoimmunity’.8 Either way, 
cosmopolitanism is nowhere to be found. As soon as it appears on the scene, at the same 
time it disappears. It is destroyed both by its enemies and by its friends. It turns out that to 
be, cosmopolitanism must not be, that its protection amounts to its violation and its 
violation to its protection. It turns out that the only ‘realistic cosmopolitanism’ is the 
unrealistic one that Beck hides behind the façade of positive, value-free sociology—the 
idealistic, utopian kind. 
In closing this paper, it may be worthwhile to reiterate what it is not about. It is not 
about criticising Beck (or anyone else for that matter) for being a modernist. It is about 
showing the incompatibility between modernism and cosmopolitanism, between a particular 
way of life, no matter how pluralised, and cultural diversity. Nor is this paper meant to 
showcase anthropology at the expense of sociology. Cosmopolitanism is as much of an 
unachievable aim for the former as it is for the latter. It simply attempts to restore 
anthropology’s visibility as a discipline for which the otherness of the other has long been a 
key preoccupation—one that has generated an enormous amount of scholarship, which, 
regrettably, cosmopolitan sociology disregards almost completely. Finally, the paper is not 
about criticising modernity understood as the way of life of what we may broadly call 
‘Western’ societies. Unlike sociology that conceptualises itself as a ‘critical science’, 
anthropology merely strives to understand ‘the native’s point of view’—ideally at least. If 
there is anything to be criticised it is not modernity per se but the claim that it is a superior—
rather than just another—way of life. What is to be criticised, if at all, is the assumption that 
modernity is beyond or outside culture, that its fictions—cosmopolitanism, for example—are 
not local myths that may be good to think with and live by, but universal scientific principles 
and realities in the making. Yet in a paradoxical sort of way, even this cannot be criticised. 
The assumption is itself part of the mythology and to debunk it as a myth would be 
tantamount to suggesting that modernists can lead lives without fictions—which is to 
reproduce the myth inadvertently oneself. Anyway one looks at it, then, it seems that 
understanding is the only available option. 
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Notes 
1 Sadly Ulrich Beck died on the 1st of January 2015. He was a prolific writer and continued 
working on the question of cosmopolitanism well beyond 2010. Examples include Beck 
(2011), Beck and Sznaider (2011) and Beck and Levy (2013). 
2 Elsewhere (author 2002) I have argued that saving the other for the calumny of cultural 
inferiority has been the primary motivation of anthropological discourse. Sociology is a 
newcomer in this respect. 
3 I have used this insight to reflect on the question of objectivity and autonomy (author 
2013). 
4 For representative works see Go (2013), Bhambra (2013) and Steinmertz (2014). For a 
critique see McLennan (2014). 
5 For an early and highly influential work in anthropology see Hannerz (1996). 
6 The term is borrowed form Appaiah (1997). 
7 This sort of othering is no doubt carried out for the sake of tolerance, peace, respect and 
similar values encapsulated by the notion of cosmopolitanism. Yet, as we shall see, this is 
precisely the point. Cosmopolitanism must not be cosmopolitan. It cannot afford to tolerate 
those perceived as enemies—a process of self-destruction that Derrida calls ‘autoimmunity’. 
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